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We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality
is unobservable to customers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels
is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied by a competitive
fringe of firms. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed. To provide
firms with incentives to actually deliver promised quality, prices must exceed
unit variable costs. We show that for a large class of customer preferences there
is “quality polarization,” that is, only minimum andmaximum feasible quality
are available in the market. For the case without quality polarization we derive
sufficient conditions for the incentive constraints to completely determine
equilibrium prices, regardless of demand, for all intermediate quality levels.
1. Introduction
We consider amodel of vertical product differentiation in an experience
good market with free but costly entry where in each period firms
compete simultaneously in quality and price. That is, in contrast to
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other papers on vertical product differentiation we study a market for
an experience good, as introduced by Nelson (1970). In such a market
the quality of the respective good is unobservable to buyers at the time
of purchase and contracts cannot be conditioned on quality. Only after
use, and hence after purchase, buyers detect the true quality of the good
and disseminate this information. We are interested in the situation
where firms can choose among many alternative quality levels and
buyers differ in their preferences regarding quality. For this situation
we analyze the (stationary) equilibrium. In particular, we show that
for a large class of customer preferences at most two different levels of
quality are offered in equilibrium—one of thembeing the lowest and the
other one the highest technologically feasible level. Moreover, if high
quality is, in fact, available, then only for a price that is high relative to
production cost.
For the binary case, where the quality of the experience good is
either good or bad, Klein and Leffler (1981) examinedmarket incentives
for the provision of good quality.1 Specifically, Klein and Leffler (1981)
show that in order to induce a competitive firm to supply good quality,
the product’s price has to be above average production cost and thus
includes an informational rent. Delivering bad instead of good quality
will drive the respective firm out of the market, and the threat of losing
future rents leads to provision of good quality as long as a sufficiently
high “quality-assuring price” generates adequate rents.2 However, as
Klein and Leffler point out, there is a conflict between positive rents and
perfect competition with free entry. Klein and Leffler (1981) eliminate
this conflict by postulating sunk costs due to “nonsalvageable” assets,
such as, for example, “brand name capital” due to noninformative
advertising. The size of these sunk costs, in equilibrium, is implied
by the firm’s incentive compatibility constraint to provide good quality.
Specifically, it follows from the condition that the firm’s indispensable
informational rent is just the normal return on its sunk cost. Thus,
excess profits are wiped out by an entry cost equal to the capitalized
informational rent.
In our model the cost of market entry is exogenous (rather
than being determined by the indispensable informational rent) and
determines, together with demand conditions, the number and size of
firms active in the market and the range of product qualities available.
1. The pioneering article by Klein and Leffler (1981) has been followed up by Shapiro
(1983). Closely related papers are, among others, Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Bester
(1998), Cabral (2009), Maksimovic and Titman (1991), Neeman andOrosel (2004), Riordan
(1986), Rogerson (1988), and Wolinsky (1983).
2. This repeat-purchase contract enforcing mechanism is an example of a self-
enforcing contract mechanism that plays an important role in contract theory. See, for
example, Crawford (1985), Levin (2003), MacLeod (2007).
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The range of product qualities that are actually offered in equilibrium
is the center stage of our analysis. Obviously, this question cannot be
examined inKlein andLeffler’s (1981)model of binaryquality.Ourmain
result is that for a large class of customer preferences there is “quality
polarization” in equilibrium, that is, only minimum and maximum
feasible quality is available in the market. This can explain the casual
observation that in some markets for experience goods there is little
variety in available levels of quality and, in addition, high quality is
quite expensive relative to production cost.
Examples for low quality diversity can be found among markets
for “natural food.” In the continuous dimension of “conventionally
grown/semi-organic/organic food,” firms canpotentially produce food
in many different quality levels. However, almost always only two
quality levels are actually offered—low quality (conventionally grown)
and high quality (organic). Intermediate qualities (semi-organic) are
rarely observed. Market surveys indicate that the price premia of
organic foods over conventional foods are substantial (see, e.g., Greene
et al., 2009 and the references therein). An example in case are organic
soybeans in 2006 in the United States: according to Greene et al. (2009)
the price premium relative to conventional soybeans exceeded the
(generously estimated) cost difference (where even organic transition
costs are included) by almost 50%.3
Another illustration for quality polarization is the market for
catastrophe insurance. In this market customers care about the financial
quality and default risk of firms, but cannot observe the complicated
system of reinsurance contracts and the respective reinsurers’ financial
capabilities, which are decisive for the default risk of a particular
insurance company.Zanjani (2002) provides an empirical analysis of this
industry and shows that almost all firms (more than 90%, if measured
by their market share in the volume of premia—Zanjani 2002 does not
contain firm data) deliver top financial quality in the sense that their
reserves and reinsurance contracts exceed substantially expected claims
and regulatory requirements (see, in particular, Zanjani, 2002, table 1,
p. 297).
Although we show that for a well-defined class of customer
preferences there will be quality polarization, we do not contend that
the majority of experience good markets show low-quality diversity.
3. “Average costs for producing organic soybeans were as much as $6.20 per bushel
higher than conventional production in 2006, after accounting for the influence of other
factors on production costs, including organic transition costs [. . .]. The average price
premium for organic soybeans was $9.16 per bushel in 2006 [. . .] (Greene et al., 2009,
p. 14).
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However, we regard the lack of intermediate qualities as sufficiently
widespread to deserve an explanation.
For an intuitive explanation of the polarization result notice that
incentive constraints for provision of aboveminimumquality limit price
competition. In particular, for each quality level the respective quality-
assuring price (i.e., the lowest incentive compatible price) becomes a
price floor. Consequently, Bertrand competition fails to squeeze out
profits, enablingmultiple firms to cover entry costs in thehighest quality
segment. Whereas standard economics suggests that firms differentiate
to avoid price competition, the quality-assuring price prevents price
competition and thus significantly reduces the incentive of firms to
differentiate. In the respective analysis we consider customer prefer-
ences which imply that at quality-assuring prices (but not necessarily
at equilibrium prices) only a corner solution, that is, either the lowest
or the highest feasible quality, can be optimal for any customer. For
this case we show that it can never be profit-maximizing for a firm
to offer intermediate quality, even if all rivals’ prices are above the
quality-assuring prices and the respective firm could attract customers
for some intermediate quality and make a positive profit. Thus, there
cannot be an equilibrium where some intermediate quality is offered.
From this the polarization result follows. Because prices are endogenous
and can be above quality-assuring prices, quality polarization does not
immediately follow from the assumption about customer preferences.
For example, it is conceivable and may even seem plausible, that with
two firms in the market one offers maximum quality for a high price
that well exceeds the respective quality-assuring price and the other
firm supplies some intermediate quality at a price at or above the
quality-assuring price. Both firms have positive demand and make a
positive profit. Our analysis shows that nevertheless this cannot be an
equilibriumbecause the firmoffering intermediate quality cando better.
For preferences that do not imply quality polarization an equi-
librium in pure strategies may not exist. As in location models of
horizontal product differentiation with more than two firms, the reason
for nonexistence stems from discontinuities associated with Bertrand
competition. Although we do not supply existence conditions for the
nonpolarization case, we provide a condition on customer preferences
that allows to derive the equilibrium prices for intermediate quality,
conditional, of course, on equilibrium existence (in pure or mixed
strategies). Specifically, this (sufficient) condition implies that for all
intermediate quality levels the equilibrium prices must be the quality-
assuring prices. This result follows from the fact that, given the respec-
tive assumption on preferences, a firm can always simultaneously raise
price and quality in such a way that its profit increases, unless the firm
Quality Diversity and Prices in Markets for Experience Goods 713
already charges the quality-assuring price or offers maximum feasible
quality.
Our model is one of moral hazard and incentives rather than one
of adverse selection and signaling. Because in the recent literature the
term “reputation” is used predominantly, though not exclusively, in
connection with adverse selection, we avoid that term in this paper.4 In
our analysis the problem is not firms’ reputation with respect to (given)
types, but customers’ trust regarding firms’ behavior.5 Specifically, we
assume that customers trust firms whenever conditional on this trust
a firm has no incentive to “cheat,” that is, to provide lower quality
than promised. This assumption concerns off-equilibrium beliefs, and
it excludes equilibria where firms never produce higher than minimum
quality because customers stubbornlybelieve that quality is always at its
lowest feasible level.Whenever customers understand firms’ incentives
sufficiently well this assumption is justified.
From our theoretical analysis three testable implications follow.
(i) As in theKlein–Lefflermodel, our study implies that price differences
for alternative quality levels should significantly exceed the respective
differences in production cost. (ii) If for all customers the willingness to
pay for quality is convex as a function of quality (measured by produc-
tion cost), quality polarization should be observed. That is, only extreme
quality levels—“high” and “low”—should be available in the market.
(iii) If an increase in quality raises all customers’ willingness to pay by
more than it raises the respective production cost, prices of alternative
quality levels below maximum quality should be a linear function
of production cost. Moreover, these prices should be independent of
demand shifts (which should affect only the quantities demanded
and produced) and of changes in the intensity of competition due
to alterations in the firms’ entry cost. The implication’s condition
that relative to production cost customers have a sufficiently strong
preference for quality, is frequently used in the literature on Bertrand
equilibria in markets with vertical product differentiation (e.g., Shaked
and Sutton, 1983, 1987; Sutton, 1986, 1991), and it is specified more
precisely in Section 6 below. The condition is compatible with convex
willingness to pay functions, but in that case intermediate quality levels
should not be observed in the market because of implication (ii) above.
4. Examples of papers on reputation that include adverse selection as an essential
element are, among others, Holmstro¨m (1999), Tadelis (1999), Mailath and Samuelson
(2001), Ho¨rner (2002), Cripps et al. (2004). For our analysis of the moral hazard problem
we need not be concerned with the questions of how reputation can be acquired, how it
is lost, and how it can be used strategically.
5. This distinction coincides with Cabral (2005, p. 3), where “trust” refers to the
situation “when agents expect a particular agent to do something,” whereas “reputation”
refers to the situation “when agents believe a particular agent to be something.”
714 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Thus, in the case of convex willingness to pay functions implication
(iii), though correct, is empty.6
As it is the case with other empirical studies, an empirical test
of our model would have to overcome several obstacles. First, the
product under investigation must be well-defined, that is, different
quality levels of the product must unambiguously be distinguished
fromrelatedbutdifferent goods. Second, “quality”must bewell-defined
and measurable. Specifically, a particular dimension of quality (like
durability) or, alternatively, an index of “overall quality” may be used.
Third, production cost data for alternative levels of quality, according to
the chosen quality criterion, are needed. Finally, customer preferences
are not directly observable. However, the willingness to pay functions
could, in principle, be detected by questionnaires, experiments or other
methods.
Although overcoming these difficulties may not be easy, they are
not fundamentally different from those confronting other empirical
studies. In particular, they do not imply that our model lacks testable
implications. Rather, we provide three empirical implications, specified
above, that can be tested in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss
some related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the model.
Then, in Section 4, we derive the quality-assuring prices from the
incentive compatibility constraints for firms to provide high quality.
In Section 5, we analyze the case where customers’ willingness to pay
for quality is convex with respect to quality and derive the polarization
result. In Section 6, we demonstrate that under a certain condition on
customer preferences equilibrium prices for intermediate quality are
completely determined by the incentive compatibility constraints alone,
whereas customer preferences, the distribution of customer types, and
the intensity of competition only determine the quantities demanded
and produced, given (predetermined) equilibrium prices. Finally, we
conclude in Section 7. All mathematical proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2. Related Work
As pointed out earlier, our analysis is based on Klein and Leffler (1981).
In addition, it is also related to the literature on the analysis of Bertrand
equilibria in markets with vertical product differentiation (see, e.g.,
6. However, if customers’ willingness to pay for quality is not convex, existence of
an equilibrium is not guaranteed (see Section 6 below). Thus, the usual assumption of
empirical research that observations correspond to equilibrium outcomes is perhapsmore
critical in this case than in other cases.
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Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983).7
However, it differs from this literature (and the related analysis of
endogenous sunk cost and the associated “finiteness result;” see, e.g.,
Sutton, 1986, 1991; Shaked and Sutton, 1983, 1987; Anderson et al.,
1992, 305–313; Berry and Waldfogel, 2009) in three important respects.8
First, quality cannot be observed by customers before purchase and
therefore, due to incentive reasons, high qualities must have high
(quality-assuring) prices relative to production costs. That is, costs must
also include an incentive component. Second, the quoted literature
on Bertrand equilibria in markets with vertical product differentiation
assumes basically that the cost increase associated with an increase in
quality is negligible in the sense that the cost increase is always below
customers’ willingness to pay for that increase in quality. In contrast,
we do not use the corresponding assumption in our analysis, which
would be that customers’ willingness to pay for higher quality is always
larger than the increase in production-cum-incentive cost. Third, while
the respective literature concentrates on the casewhere firmsdecide first
on quality and then, given the (observable) quality choices, on prices,
we consider the case where firms decide simultaneously about quality
and price (i.e., knowing neither price nor quality chosen by competitors).
This approach is natural in our context where quality is unobservable
and firms have an incentive to “cheat” customers by producing and
selling unobservably low quality for a high price.
Bester (1998) considers a standard Hotelling model of spatial
competition for a duopoly where the horizontally differentiated good
is an experience rather than an inspection good. The good’s qual-
ity is either high or low and, as in our model, the price of high
quality includes an incentive component. This puts a floor on the
price for high quality that is above the production cost and that the
firms cannot undercut. Consequently, price competition is mitigated
and because of this the equilibrium outcome may (but need not) be
7. For a Cournot analysis of vertical product differentiation see, for example,
Gal-Or (1983). Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992) analyze Bertrand equilibria of a vertically
differentiated duopoly where consumers have exogenous beliefs about which of the
two firms sells high quality and which sells low quality. Another strain of literature,
based on Mussa and Rosen (1978), deals with quality provision by a monopolist (see, e.g.,
Gabszewicz and Wauthy, 2002 and the references therein). For an analysis of vertical
product differentiation with high and low qualities under monopolistic or competitive
conditions see Carlton and Dana (2008). However, due to differences in focus the
conclusions of this literature are not readily comparable to our results.
8. A fourth respect in which our model differs is our assumption that minimum
quality is offered at marginal cost by a competitive fringe. However, although such an
assumption would affect the equilibrium prices, the main results of the papers quoted
above would remain essentially unchanged because under the assumptions of these
models the competitive fringe would have no customers.
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“minimum differentiation” rather than “maximum differentiation.”
Our model of only vertical product differentiation differs from Bester’s
in many respects (in particular, we consider a continuum of qualities,
no spatial competition and endogenous entry, whereas Bester considers
a continuum of locations, only two quality levels and an exogenously
given duopoly) and thus a direct comparison is not possible. However,
the two models share the property that asymmetric information about
quality mitigates price competition. In fact, our result of low quality
diversitymaybe interpreted as corresponding, in some sense, to Bester’s
result of “minimum differentiation,” that is, low spatial diversity.9
Within the literature on vertical product differentiation there is
a branch that investigates how customers’ informational differences
with respect to different brands may constitute a barrier to entry (see,
e.g., Schmalensee, 1982; Bagwell, 1990). The informational differences
are in fact differences with respect to supplier reputation. Whereas the
incumbent has reputation (the quality of his product is “known”), a new
entrant has no reputation (the quality of her product is not “known”).
In this literature, firms are of different “types,” e.g., high- and low-
quality producers. Thus, customers face an adverse selection problem,
and reputation is about firms’ (unalterable) types. In contrast, in our
paper firms are not distinguished by types, and consequently, there
is no adverse selection. Rather, we analyze the moral hazard problem
associated with firms that can choose the quality they provide.
3. The Model
We consider amarket for a good that is homogeneous except for quality.
That is, there is (potentially) vertical product differentiation but no
horizontal product differentiation. Time is measured in discrete periods
t∈ {1, 2, . . .}. There is a (large) pool ofN firms that are capable to produce
each quality v ∈ [0, 1] of the good considered at constant marginal cost
c(v) > 0, where the function c:[0, 1] → R++ is strictly increasing. That
is, marginal cost is independent of quantity but increasing with respect
to quality. Moreover, because c(v) is strictly increasing, quality can be
measured without loss of generality in such a way that cost is linear in
9. Models of horizontal and vertical differentiation are not as different as frequently
perceived. For the case of observable quality Cremer and Thisse (1991) have shown that
from the formal point of view the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation is actually
a special case of the standard model of vertical differentiation.
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quality with positive slope γ > 0,10
c(v) = c(0) + γ v. (1)
Put differently, we use production cost to measure quality. In addition
to the N firms that are capable to produce each of the technologically
feasible quality levels, there are infinitelymany firms that are capable of
producing minimum quality v = 0 at cost c(0). Although a firm may be
capable of producing multiple quality levels, we assume, in agreement
with most of the literature,11 that in each period it can produce and
offer only one particular level of quality. However, we will show that
except for the case of a monopoly the polarization result is independent
of this assumption. The number N of firms that can produce all quality
levels should be interpreted to be large. Thus, potentially the good can
be supplied in many different quality levels.
In equilibrium not all firms will be active in the market and
produce. Firms that are active in the market are distinguished between
“brand names” and “no names.” No names produce only minimum
quality v = 0, whereas brand names may produce any quality level
v ∈ [0, 1]. Any firm can be active as a no name, and each of the N
potential producers of all quality levels can be active as a brand name.
Even if a no name is capable of producing positive quality, it will
not do so because customers believe that all no names provide only
minimum quality (Assumption 3 later). A brand name has to announce
the quality of its product in some appropriate way and we call this the
“announced quality.” These announcements may take different forms,
such as inscriptions on the product or its package, TV or newspaper
ads, billboard advertising, promotion campaigns, and so forth. It is also
possible that the price itself serves as quality announcement. In fact, we
will show below that in a stationary equilibrium quality can be inferred
from the price, making explicit quality announcements dispensable.
Actual quality is private information of the firm and may or may
not coincide with the announced quality. Between periods brand names
can change their announced and actual quality levels, respectively, at
no cost. In the model we assume that brand names have to announce
the quality in each period, but the absence of a fresh announcement
10. Let V ∈ [Vmin , Vmax ] be any measure of quality with associated marginal cost
C(V) > 0 that increases in V but is constant in quantity. Defining v ≡ [C(V) −
C(Vmin )]/[C(Vmax ) − C(Vmin )] ∈ [0, 1] gives the required normalized measurement of
quality. For any quality level Vˆ with normalized equivalent vˆ we get the marginal cost
c(vˆ) = C(Vˆ) = C(Vmin) + [C(Vmax) − C(Vmin)]vˆ = c(0) + γ vˆ, where c(0) ≡ C(Vmin ) and
γ ≡ C(Vmax ) − C(Vmin ).
11. See, e.g., Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980),
Klein and Leffler (1981). For “umbrella branding,” the practice of labelling more than one
product with a single brand name, see Cabral (2009) and the references therein.
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may count as implicit renewal of the previous one. We assume that no
names have no entry cost and thus form a competitive fringe that sells
minimum quality at marginal cost c(0) and has zero payoff. In contrast,
each brand name has to incur a positive entry cost, not necessarily
identical for all firms, in order to establish the respective brand together
with an associated distribution channel. A brand name that voluntarily
leaves the market may enter again, either simultaneously or later,
but it has to pay the entry cost for each entry. Brand names choose
their respective prices, together with their respective quality levels,
simultaneously at the beginning of each period. That is, we assume
Bertrand competition.
In each period there is an atomless continuum of customers of
(Lebesgue) measure 1. Customers live one period and are distinguished
by “types” s ∈ S = [smin, smax] ⊂ R according to their willingness to pay
for quality. Their preferences are specified by the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 1 (Customer Preferences): Each customer buys at most one
unit of the good. The payoff from not buying the good is normalized to zero. For
customers of type s ∈ S the payoff from buying one unit of the good of quality v
for the price p is given by U(v, p, s) = R(v, s) − p. For all v ∈ (0, 1) and s ∈ S ,
the function R( ·, ·) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in
quality v, and Rvs( ·, ·) > 0 for v > 0,where subscripts ofR( ·, ·) always denote
the respective partial derivatives.
The assumption Rvs( ·, ·) > 0 is a single crossing condition and
means that customer types can be defined in such a way that “higher”
types have a higher willingness to pay for additional quality, that
is, have a higher marginal willingness to pay for quality. Because of
this assumption, the difference in willingness to pay between any
two quality levels v′ and v′′ > v′, R(v′′, s) − R(v′, s) = ∫ v′′
v′ Rv(v, s)dv,
is strictly increasing in s for any such pair v′, v′′ ∈ [0, 1].12 Specifically,
the additional amount of money that a customer of type s is willing to
pay when the good is of highest rather than of lowest feasible quality,
r(s) ≡ R(1, s) − R(0, s), is strictly increasing. For convenience we hence-
forth identify customer types by this difference r(s), that is, without loss
of generality we assume s ≡ R(1, s) − R(0, s). Notice that the shape of
this willingness to pay function R( ·, ·), in particular, whether or not it is
convex, depends on the way quality is measured. The normalization of
12. Except for points of inflection the converse also holds. Whenever for all
v′ ′, v′ ∈ [0, 1], v′ ′ > v′, the difference R(v′′, s) − R(v′, s) = ∫ v′′
v′ Rv(v, s)dv, is strictly
increasing in s for all s ∈ S, then Rvs( ·, ·) > 0 except for isolated points v˜ ∈ [0, 1]. This
follows from ∂[R(v
′′ ,s)−R(v′ ,s)]
∂s =
∫ v′′
v′ Rvs (v, s)dv.
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(1) implies that we use (constant) marginal cost to measure quality, and
the function R( ·, ·) is defined using this measurement.
In this study, we consider the case where at the time of purchase a
product’s quality is private information of the producer and cannot be
observed by other agents; nor can contracts be conditioned on quality. In
such a situation, a firm could save on cost by producing lower quality
than announced, and in the following we refer to such behavior as
“cheating.”
In some cases, the information that a certain product does not have
the announced qualitymay spread slowly and the firm that sells it in the
marketmay be able to exploit the trust among customers it has acquired
in the past for a relatively long period. In other cases, this information
may become public almost instantaneously and force the firm to close
down. The relevant point is not how fast or towhat extent the respective
firm’s business is diminished, but that a cheating firm risks that it will
be punished by a reduction of demand. The expected punishment gives
rise to an incentive compatibility constraint that, if satisfied, induces
the firm to provide the announced quality. Regardless of the details of
the model, this constraint necessarily implies that the price of a good
above minimum quality must be sufficiently above its average cost.
Otherwise the firm would cheat and produce only minimum quality.
Because customers cannot immediately observe quality and contracts
cannot be conditioned on quality, a firm that produces high qualitymust
earn an informational rent. The threat of losing this rent provides the
incentive for the firm to actually produce the announced quality.
Using the repeat-purchase contract enforcing mechanism, we
model the customers’ learningof the respective good’s quality following
Klein and Leffler (1981) and the literature on experience goods and
assume perfect monitoring, so that at the end of each period the true
quality is revealed to the public.13
Assumption 2 (Perfect Quality Monitoring): If in any period t ∈ {1,
2, . . .} the true quality of a product is below the quality announced by its
producer, the respective brand name has to exit the market at the end of this
period and receives a payoff of zero from the next period onwards.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs may lead to (implausible) equilibria
where brand names cannot exist. To avoid such equilibria we assume,
like Bester (1998, pp. 833–834), that customers trust firms whenever
conditional on this trust the respective firm has no incentive to cheat.
13. Imperfect monitoring, where in each period the true quality is revealed to the
public with some probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1] and where with complementary probability 1 − ϕ
there is no information about a product’s quality, can easily be accommodated and does
not change the results in a substantive way.
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Assumption 3 (Customer Beliefs): Customers cannot observe the true
quality of a product before purchase. They believe that the true quality is the
announced quality unless given these beliefs it is optimal for a firm to provide
lower quality. Otherwise, they believe that the true quality is the minimum
quality v = 0. No names are believed always to provide minimum quality.
Because no names have no entry cost, they always offer quality v
= 0 for the price p(0) = c(0) under perfectly competitive conditions.
Therefore, we restrict the terms “entry” and “incumbent” to brand
names. Moreover, because no names do not behave strategically, we
do not treat them explicitly as players in the game. In contrast, potential
and actual brand names act strategically. In their decisions they take the
“competitive fringe” of no names into account, as well as the strategies
of all players.
We assume that all firms have the same discount rate ρ > 0. The
associated discount factor is denoted by δ ≡ 11+ρ ∈ (0, 1). A firm’s payoff
is the sum of its discounted profits minus its entry cost, if it has entered
the market, and zero otherwise. If more than one brand name offers the
same quality v ∈ (0, 1] for the lowest price in the market, all those brand
names share the respective demand equally.
Our analysis is based on the following game with imperfect
information. The set of players consists of brand names, customers, and
“nature.” Brand names know the distribution of customer preferences,
but cannot observe the individual types. Customers cannot observe
the quality of the goods offered in the market. The cost function (1)
and the rest of the model are common knowledge. In each period
t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, the game proceeds in four phases. In the first phase, at
the beginning of the period, brand names decide simultaneously about
entry and exit. That is, brand names that are not (or not anymore) in the
market decide whether to enter, and brand names that are in the market
decide whether to exit. In the second phase, still at the beginning of
the period, all brand names in the market observe the moves made
in the first phase and choose simultaneously announced quality, actual
quality, and price (each for the respective period). Customers and firms
observe the announced qualities and prices, but actual qualities are
private information, unobservable to customers and rival firms. In
the third phase, which takes place at the end of the period, customers
decide whether and from which supplier to buy one unit of the good.
These decisions are executed and the period’s payoffs accrue. Finally,
in phase four, each brand name that had provided some quality below
the announced quality has to leave the market forever. A brand name
that has to leave the market receives no further payoff (but keeps the
payoffs received so far).
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Because we are not interested in collusion among firms, we want
to rule out folk theorem type results. In standard models this can
be done by considering only those equilibria of the dynamic game
that consist of playing a particular equilibrium of the stage game in
every period. In our model the situation is somewhat different because
the only reason why firms do not cheat are their future rents, and
therefore the game that incumbent firms play in each period is not
the relevant “stage game.” In any one-period “stage game” (as well as
in any finite version of the dynamic game) incumbents would always
cheat, and because customers would anticipate this and thus not buy
the respective product, no brand name would enter the market and
no positive quality would be available in equilibrium. In our model,
the analog of an equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the dynamic game
that consists of playing an equilibrium of the stage game in every
period, is what we call an equilibrium in stationary strategies or, for
short, a stationary equilibrium.We define a brand name’s strategy to
be stationary,if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) the firm
either enters the market in the first period t = 1 or not at all; (ii)
if the firm had entered, its announced quality, actual quality, and
price are constant in time and independent of the history of actions.
Accordingly, an equilibrium(in pure strategies) is stationary, if all brand
names’ equilibrium strategies are stationary. The requirement that all
brand names’ equilibrium strategies are independent of the history of
actions makes collusion unattainable. Throughout the paper we focus
on stationary equilibria in pure strategies.
4. Incentive Compatibility Constraints in a
Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the incentive compatibility constraint for a
firm to provide a given quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1] in a stationary equilibrium.
Consider a putative stationary equilibrium, where in some period t a
firm offers a product of some announced and actual quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1]
for some price p¯, sells x¯ units in this period, and considers to do the
same in every future period. An alternative—deviating—strategy is to
cheat and provide in that period t onlyminimum quality, which implies
involuntary exit immediately after period t.14 The firm’s incentive
14. Clearly, it is never optimal to cheat by providing a quality that is below the
announced one but above minimum quality. Compared to providing minimum quality,
the cost—market exit—is the same whereas the benefit—reduction of production cost—is
lower.
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constraint to actually provide quality v¯ is
δ
1 − δ [ p¯ − c(v¯)]x¯ ≥ δ{[ p¯ − c(0)]x¯},
where the left hand side is the payoff
∑∞
τ=1 δ
τ [ p¯ − c(v¯)]x¯ from always
producingquality v¯ and the right hand side is thepayoff fromproducing
quality v = 0 followed by market exit.15 This gives 1
ρ
[ p¯ − c(v¯)]x¯ ≥ γ v¯x¯
or, after re-arranging,
p¯ ≥ c(v¯) + ργ v¯. (2)
In a stationary equilibrium, this incentive compatibility constraint has to
hold for all quality levels v¯ ∈ (0, 1] that are actually produced. It cannot
be an equilibrium that some quality v¯ is sold at a lower price because
at a lower price the respective firm would cheat and in equilibrium this
would be anticipated by its customers.
Let pˆ (v) denote the minimal incentive compatible price, or
“quality-assuring price” (Klein and Leffler, 1981), for quality v ∈
[0, 1] in a stationary equilibrium, that is,
pˆ(v) ≡ c(v) + ργ v, v ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
These prices include the incentive cost ργ v in addition to the production
cost c(v). This incentive cost is proportional to the discount rate ρ and
vanishes when ρ converges to 0.16
In any stationary equilibrium the price p(v) must satisfy
p(v) ≥ pˆ(v) (4)
for each quality v ∈ [0, 1] that is sold in the market.17
Because of (4), prices exceed marginal costs for positive levels
of quality and this has significant consequences for firms’ incentives
to differentiate. If quality were immediately observable to customers,
15. Equivalently, the present value of the benefit from cheating, which is δ[c(v¯) −
c(0)]x¯ = δγ v¯x¯, must not exceed the present value of the cost of cheating,which is δ δ1−δ [ p¯ −
c(v¯)]x¯ = δ
ρ
[ p¯ − c(v¯)]x¯. Both arguments give the incentive constraint 1
ρ
[ p¯ − c(v¯)]x¯ ≥ γ v¯x¯.
16. Thus, pˆ(v) approaches zero profit pricing for ρ → 0. This result is not due to
the way we model monitoring, but follows from the assumption that the punishment
for cheating consists in forced market exit. If in a stationary equilibrium the (constant)
profit per period andunit sold is positive, sayπ > 0, its capitalized value π
ρ
—and therefore
the punishment of forced market exit—goes to infinity as the discount rate ρ goes to zero.
This “exploding punishment” explains why the required rent π per period, and with it
the incentive cost, converges to zero for ρ → 0.
17. There is a related problem in the regulation of banks: deposit-rate ceilings can
be used as incentives for banks to invest in safe rather than in inefficiently risky assets
(“gambling assets”) because deposit-rate ceilings increase banks’ profits per period and
thus their charter values (Hellmann et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004).
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Bertrand competition would imply that whenever two or more firms
offer the same quality v the price p(v) must equal marginal cost c(v), and
consequently profits are zero. Therefore, firms have a strong incentive
to differentiate from each other. In contrast, this is not true in our case of
unobservable quality and the reason is (4). Because equilibrium prices
for positive qualitymust always strictly exceedmarginal costs, Bertrand
competition does not any more imply that profits are zero when two or
more firms offer the same quality. This reduces, andmay even eliminate,
the incentive of firms to differentiate from each other. As a consequence,
little variety of quality may result.
In the rest of the paper we examine stationary equilibria in
pure strategies. In a stationary equilibrium, by definition, equilibrium
strategies are constant in time and independent of the history of actions.
For our subsequent analysis we define a new game, the restricted game,
by restricting the strategy set of each firm to stationary strategies. In this
restricted game we have an equilibrium, if all firms’ strategies are best
replies in the set of stationary strategies. The following lemma shows that
for a stationary equilibrium it is sufficient to consider only stationary
strategies.
Lemma 1: A strategy profile that constitutes a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies of the restricted game is also a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
of the original game. 18
Because of Lemma 1 we can ignore nonstationary strategies. The
proof (in theAppendix) demonstrates thatwhenever afirmhas apayoff-
increasing nonstationary strategy against the other firms’ stationary
strategies, this firm also has a payoff-increasing stationary strategy.
In a stationary equilibrium of our game nothing can be learned
from the past and the strategic situation is exactly the same in every
period. It follows that equilibrium strategies are sequentially rational
and that a stationary equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.19
5. Convex Willingness to Pay
The shape of customers’ willingness to pay functionsR(v, s), specifically
whether or not they are convexwith respect to quality v, has a significant
18. Obviously, the converse also holds: if a strategy profile of stationary strategies
constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the original game, it also constitutes a Nash equilibrium
of the restricted game.
19. Because actual qualities are private information, the only proper subgames are the
ones starting at the second phase of the first period, after market entry. It is easy to see
that all equilibria are subgame perfect.
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effect on the equilibrium.20 In this section we investigate the case where
customers’ willingness to pay R(v, s) is convex in quality v, that is,
Rvv( ·, ·) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.21 That includes, in particular, the case
where R( ·, ·) is linear in v, and specifically the case R(v, s) = sv that
is typically used in models of vertical product differentiation (e.g.,
Mussa and Rosen, 1978). We show that in the convex case at most
the two extreme quality levels, v = 0 and v = 1, are available in the
market (quality polarization).22 If two or more firms can cover their
entry cost, all will offer quality v = 1 for the price pˆ(1).23 A plausible
assumption is that higher types are willing to pay more for maximum
quality, that is, R(1, ·) is increasing in s. In this case, there exists a
critical type s¯ ∈ S = [smin, smax] such that all types s > s¯ consumequality
v = 1, whereas all types s < s¯ either abstain from consuming the good
or consume quality v = 0. Whenever s¯ ∈ (smin, smax), customer type
s¯ is indifferent between consuming quality v = 1 and the preferred
alternative of either abstention or consumption of quality v = 0.
Proposition 1: Assume that customers’ willingness to pay R( ·, ·) is
convex in v, i.e., Rvv( ·, ·) ≥ 0 . Then in every stationary equilibrium at most
the quality levels v = 0 and v = 1 are available in the market. If the market can
accommodate two or more firms that offer positive quality, the only equilibrium
in stationary strategies is that all those firms offer v = 1 for the price p(1) =
pˆ(1) = c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ . If customers’ willingness to pay for maximum quality
R(1, ·) is strictly increasing in type s , there exists a customer type s¯ ∈ S such
that all types s < s¯ either abstain from consuming the good or consume quality
v = 0, and all types s > s¯ consume quality v = 1. Provided two or more firms
20. Some customers will never demand positive quality at prices p(v) ≥ pˆ(v) and thus
the shape of their willingness to pay functions is irrelevant. Specifically, if for a customer
type s˜ it holds that R(v, s˜) − pˆ(v) < max[R(0, s˜) − c(0), 0] for all v ∈ (0, 1], it follows from
the incentive constraint (4) that this type will never demand positive quality. Thus we
could limit any assumption on the shape of R( ·, ·) to “relevant” types.
21. Recall that the shape of the functionR( ·, ·) depends on thewayquality ismeasured.
However, if there is somemeasurement of quality such that, given thatmeasurement, cost
is (weakly) concave and willingness to pay is (weakly) convex in that measurement, then
the normalization of (1) implies that R( ·, ·) is convex in v. To see this, let V ∈ [Vmin , Vmax ]
be such a measurement of quality. As footnote 10 shows, v ≡ μ + βC(V), where β > 0 and
μ are constants, gives (1). Consequently, V = C−1( v−μ
β
). Defining B(v) ≡ C−1( v−μ
β
), the
willingness to pay of type s for quality V, denoted by Rˆ(V, s), gives R(v, s) = Rˆ(V, s) =
Rˆ[B(v), s]. Therefore, ∂
2R(v,s)
∂2V
= ∂2 Rˆ(V,s)
∂2V
[B ′(v)]2 + ∂ Rˆ(V,s)
∂V B
′′(v), where ∂ Rˆ(V,s)
∂V > 0. Thus,
C′ ′(v) ≤ 0 (which implies B′ ′(v) ≥ 0) and ∂2 Rˆ(V,s)
∂2V
≥ 0 gives ∂2R(v,s)
∂2v ≥ 0.
22. Convexity of the willingness to pay R(v, s) in v does not imply that the payoff
R(v, s) − p(v) is convex in v unless p(v) is concave. Therefore, extreme qualities are not
simply implied by the fact that a convex objective function induces a corner solution.
Rather, quality polarization follows from the firms’ optimal choices of quality and price.
23. Because we have normalized the population to have measure 1, the entry cost has
to be measured relative to the size of the population.
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offer positive (and thus maximum) quality, the (indifferent) customer type s¯
decreases strictly with the firms’ discount rate ρ for s¯ ∈ (smin, smax).
Intuitively, Proposition 1 follows from two observations. First, as
noted above, the limitation of price competition due to the price floor
of the quality-assuring price for maximum quality eliminates the need
of firms to differentiate themselves from competitors and allows all
oligopolistic firms to profitably offer maximum quality. Second, as the
proof of Proposition 1 shows, the convexity of customers’ willingness
to pay functions has an important implication for the profitability of the
firms’ alternative price-quality strategies. If a customer is willing to buy
some particular intermediate quality v¯ for some price p(v¯) at or above
the respective quality-assuring price pˆ(v¯), this customer is also willing
to buy any higher quality v > v¯, and in particular maximum quality
v = 1, at a price that is not below the respective quality-assuring
price pˆ(v) and, in addition, implies a higher profit per customer.
Consequently, a firm’s profit increases when it simultaneously raises
price and quality in the right proportion. Because of this, only a strategy
where the firm offers maximum quality can be profit-maximizing.
Proposition 1 implies polarization of quality provision, but does
not tell under which conditions both or only one of the extreme
quality levels, v = 0 and v = 1, are available and actually purchased
in equilibrium. This depends on the distribution of customer types
and, to some extent, on the tie-breaking rules of indifferent agents.
In the following brief analysis the tie-breaking rules are as follows
(the results for alternative tie-breaking rules are straightforward and
analogous): (i) customers choose high quality unless low quality or
abstention generates a strictly higher payoff, and choose low quality
only if both high quality and abstention generate a strictly lower payoff;
(ii) firms enter themarket whenever the payoff is non-negative. Because
minimum quality v = 0 is always available in the market, maximum
quality v = 1 will be purchased at a given price p(1) only by customers
who at that price prefer maximum quality both to minimum quality
and to not buying the good at all, that is, by customers who satisfy the
condition R(1, s) − p(1) ≥ max [R(0, s) − c(0), 0]. Because by definition
s = R(1, s) − R(0, s), the condition is equivalent to s ≥ max [p(1) −
c(0), p(1) − R(0, s)]. For any price p(1), let μ (p(1)) denote the measure
(or “quantity”) of customers that satisfy s ≥ max [p(1) − c(0), p(1) −
R(0, s)]. Consider first the case where only a single firm offersmaximum
quality and let pM(1) ≥ pˆ(1) denote the respective monopoly price.
The putative monopolist can cover her entry cost, denoted by η, if
and only if η ≤ 1
ρ
μ(pM(1))[pM(1) − c(1)]. Let η1 and η2 ≥ η1 denote
the lowest and the second lowest entry cost, respectively, in the set N
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of potential brand names. If even a monopolist with minimum entry
cost cannot cover her entry cost, maximum quality is not available.
Consequently, ρη1 ≤ μ(pM(1))[pM(1) − c(1)] is necessary and sufficient
for maximum quality to be available in the market. This condition is
satisfied, if (but not only if) the monopolist can cover the entry cost
at the price pˆ(1), i.e., if η1 ≤ 1ρ μ( pˆ(1))[ pˆ(1) − c(1)] = γ μ( pˆ(1)), because
(3) implies pˆ(1) − c(1) = ργ . Moreover, since with two or more firms
offering maximum quality the equilibrium price is pˆ(1), at least two
brand names can cover their entry cost if and only if η2 ≤ γ2 μ( pˆ(1)).
Finally, minimum quality is always available in the market, but it will
actually be purchased only if there are customers who strictly prefer it
(a) to maximum quality (if available) and (b) to not buying the good
at all. The resulting condition is R(0, s) − c(0) > max [R(1, s) − p(1), 0]
if maximum quality is available at the price p(1) ∈ { pˆ(1), pM(1)}, and
R(0, s) − c(0) > 0 if maximum quality is not available.
Linearity of marginal cost c(v) and convexity of willingness to pay
R(v, s) in quality v imply that the sumof consumer rents and total profits
can be maximized with just the two extreme quality levels v = 0 and
v = 1. Thus, the lack of intermediate quality levels is efficient. It does not
follow, however, that the equilibrium outcome is constrained efficient in
the sense that a planner who does not have more information than the
customers and cannot influence the parameters of the model, could not
improve the outcome. Given the inefficiency of intermediate quality
levels, the planner would allow at most one brand name to enter,
because of thepositive entry cost.When settingprices, theplanner has to
provide incentives for the firms not to cheat and hence is constrained by
the incentive constraints (4). Consequently, in the constrained efficient
outcome either one brand name offers maximum quality v = 1 for the
price pˆ(1), or—if demand is insufficient—there is no brand name. The
market outcome will not be constrained efficient, in general, because it
needs at least twobrandnames, and thus toomany, tomake sure that the
price pˆ(1) is charged. Only if there is no brand name in the market or if
there is just one brand name and p(1) = pˆ(1) is nevertheless the payoff-
maximizing price, the equilibrium outcome is constrained efficient.
Does it make a difference for the customers whether a given level
of unit variable cost consists only of production cost or of production
and incentive cost? To answer this question we alter our model in two
respects: we assume for the moment that quality is observable (so no
incentive costs accrue) and that constant marginal production costs
for quality v are given by c˜(v) = c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ v, v ∈ [0, 1], which
is identical to the sum of production and incentive costs considered
so far. In all other respects, in particular regarding preferences and
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entry cost, the model remains the same. At least when customers’
willingness to pay R( ·, s) is strictly convex in v (i.e., Rvv( ·, s) > 0),
the proof of Proposition 1 can be applied to the modified model as
well, although with a slight variation.24 It follows that only one brand
name can be in the market, because with two or more brand names all
will offer v = 1 for the price pˆ(1) = c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ that equals marginal
cost and gives zero profits. Because the brand names could not cover
the positive entry cost, only one brand name can be in the market
in a stationary equilibrium. The single brand name will offer quality
v = 1 for a price p(1) > pˆ(1). Therefore, customers will be worse off
than in the case where the same unit variable costs consist of produc-
tion costs and incentive costs, provided that the second lowest entry
cost η2 is sufficiently low for two ormore brand names to be activewhen
information is asymmetric (i.e., provided η2 ≤ γ2 μ( pˆ(1)); see above) and
hence p(1) = pˆ(1).
In our analysis we have assumed, that in each period a firm
can produce and offer only one particular level of quality. However,
except for the case of a monopoly the polarization result is independent
of this assumption. This follows because the proof of Proposition 1
implies that every brand name will always offer maximum quality,
even when it is allowed to simultaneously offer multiple quality
levels. While a monopoly may, in fact, find it profitable to offer
intermediate quality in addition to maximum quality, this cannot be
the case if two or more brand names are active in the market. Because
all brand names offer maximum quality, the equilibrium price must
be p(1) = pˆ(1) = c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ . Moreover, minimum quality v = 0
is available at the price p(0) = c(0). As a consequence, whenever
customers’ willingness to pay is convex but not linear with slope
(1 + ρ)γ , demand is zero for any intermediate quality v ∈ (0, 1) at any
incentive compatible price p(v) ≥ pˆ(v) = c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ v. A customer s
with a linear willingness to pay is willing to buy some intermediate
quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1) at some incentive compatible price p(v¯) ≥ pˆ(v¯) only
if R(v, s) = R(0, s) + (1 + ρ)γ v, R(0, s) ≥ c(0), and p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯) =
c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ v¯.25 In this particular (and rather uninteresting) case the
customer’s payoff is R(v, s) − p(v) = R(0, s) − c(0) ≥ 0 for v ∈ {0, v¯, 1},
24. The only difference is that when quality v¯ < 1 and price p(v¯) are increased
to v = 1 and p(1) = p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ , respectively, profit per customer p(1) −
c(0) − (1 + ρ)γ = p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ − c(0) − (1 + ρ)γ = p(v¯) − c(0) − (1 + ρ)γ v¯ does
not increase but remains constant.
25. For a (constant) slope of R(v, s) below (1 + ρ)γ minimum quality v = 0 at the price
p(0)= c(0) provides a higher payoff, for a (constant) slope greater than (1+ ρ)γ maximum
quality v = 1 at the price p(1) = pˆ(1) provides a higher payoff than quality v¯ at price pˆ(v¯).
If R(v, s) = R(0, s) + (1 + ρ)γ v and R(0, s) < c(0), the highest payoff is achieved by not
buying the good at all.
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and thus the same for minimum and maximum quality and intermedi-
ate quality v¯. Hence demand for these three quality levels depends on
the customer’s tie-breaking rule. Ignoring peculiar tie-breaking rules
that favor intermediate quality, firms will maximize their profits by
offering only maximum quality at the price p(1) = pˆ(1) because the
profit per customer pˆ(v) − c(v) = ργ v increases in v. This proves the
claim that except for the case of a monopoly the polarization result is
independent of the assumption that in each period a firm can produce
and offer only one particular level of quality.
6. Nonconvex Willingness to Pay
In this section, we consider the situation where customers’ willingness
to pay is not convex in quality v. In this case many outcomes, including
quality polarization, are possible, depending on customer preferences,
the distribution of customer types, and other parameters. Moreover,
because of the discontinuity associated with Bertrand competition an
equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist, analogous to location
models of horizontal product differentiation. Given these difficulties,
we focus on the question of prices. Specifically, we derive a sufficient
condition that prices for all intermediate quality levels assume their
minimum incentive compatible values pˆ(v), regardless of demand and
the intensity of competition. In an equilibrium customer preferences
and the distribution of customer types only determine the quantities
demanded, given (predetermined) prices. Perhaps surprisingly, the
relevant condition demands that customers’ willingness to pay for a
marginal increase in quality is sufficiently large.
Obviously, in a stationary equilibrium brand names have positive
profits, do not cheat and do not exit. For each quality v ∈ [0, 1]
that is available in the market there can be only one price p(v) and
it must hold that p(v) ≥ pˆ(v), where pˆ(v) is given by (3). Otherwise
the respective firm(s) would cheat. We are interested in the question
when the actual price p(v) is completely determined by the incentive
constraint, that is, when p(v) = pˆ(v) holds. For maximum quality
v = 1 the equality p(1) = pˆ(1) is true in two different circumstances.
One case occurs when the incentive cost ργ is sufficiently large to
make the price pˆ(1) = c(1) + ργ optimal (in the set {p | p ≥ pˆ(1)} of
incentive compatible prices) even for a firm that is the sole brand
name in the market. That is, the quality assuring price pˆ(1) exceeds the
monopoly price under complete information. The other case, explained
next, consists of the situation where two or more brand names offer
quality v = 1.
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If at least two brand names offer the same quality v¯ > 0, Bertrand
competition will drive the price p(v¯) to “the lowest possible value.” In
the case of observable quality this lowest possible value is the marginal
cost c(v¯). In contrast, when quality is unobservable the lowest possible
value, in any stationary equilibrium, is pˆ(v¯) because a brand name that
had announced quality v¯ > 0 and charges a price p(v¯) < pˆ(v¯) will cheat.
Because of Assumption 3 (Customer Beliefs), customers will buy its
product for a price below pˆ(v¯) only if the price is c(0). Thus, if the
firm charges a price p(v¯) < pˆ(v¯), its profit is zero, whereas it is positive
if p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯).26 Consequently, whenever two or more brand names
offer the same quality v¯ it must hold that p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯) in any stationary
equilibrium.27
Although our previous analysis has already shown that two or
more brand names may offer maximum quality v = 1, it is implausible
that two or more brand names offer the same intermediate quality
v ∈ (0, 1). However, even when only one brand name offers some
intermediate quality v¯, the lowest possible price, pˆ(v¯), may still be
optimal. In fact, we show that pˆ(v¯) is indeed optimal whenever at v¯ all
customers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality, Rv(v¯, ·), exceeds the
(constant) “marginal cost of quality” γ , that is, whenever Rv(v¯, ·) > γ .
Consequently, ifRv(v, s)>γ for all v ∈ (0, 1) and all s∈S, then p(v) = pˆ(v)
for all v ∈ [0, 1), because p(0) = c(0) = pˆ(0) holds trivially. Because of
Rvs( ·, ·) > 0, the condition Rv(v, s) > γ for all v ∈ (0, 1) and all
s ∈ S is equivalent to Rv(v, smin ) > γ for all v ∈ (0, 1). Moreover,
it is also equivalent to the condition that R(v, s) − c(v) increases in
v for all s ∈ S, because R(v, s) − c(v) = R(v, s) − c(0) − γ v. As a
consequence, at prices that equal unit production costs (but do not
include incentive costs), that is, if p(v) = c(v) for all v ∈ [0, 1], all
customers’ payoffs R(v, s) − p(v) are strictly increasing in quality.
Exactly this condition is an assumption widely used in the literature
on Bertrand equilibria in markets with vertical product differentiation
under complete information (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1983, 1987; Sutton
26. As Klein and Leffler (1981, p. 625) put it “. . . the quality-assuring price is, in
effect, a minimum price constraint ‘enforced’ by rational consumers.” This requires that
consumers either understand the model and know the firms’ cost function for quality or
have learned the quality-assuring prices from history.
27. Because brand names have no fixed cost of production, every brand name that has
incurred the entry cost can stay in the market and guarantee itself a non-negative profit
per period. Consequently, it is impossible that a brand name drives another brand name
out of the market by undercutting pˆ(v¯). In the case where (contrary to our model) brand
names have a fixed cost of production, a different argument gives the same result. With
fixed costs, undercutting will trigger a war of attrition, and in wars of attrition the most
plausible equilibria are those in mixed strategies. Because this implies expected payoffs
of zero, whereas cheating gives strictly positive payoffs, the respective brand names will
cheat. Because customers will recognize this, undercutting is not profitable.
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1986, 1991).28 Therefore, the condition used in Proposition 2 below is
well in line with the literature.
Proposition 2: Assume that Rv(v¯, ·) > γ for some intermediate quality
level v¯ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., all customers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality
v¯ exceeds the “marginal cost of quality.” Then, if there exists a stationary
equilibrium where quality v¯ is offered, its price p(v¯) is the minimal incentive
compatible price, that is, p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯). If the assumption Rv(v¯, ·) > γ holds for
all intermediate quality levels v¯ ∈ (0, 1), then this resultp(v¯) = pˆ(v¯) holds for
each quality levelv¯ ∈ [0, 1) that is below the highest feasible level.29
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. Given any inter-
mediate quality v¯ and a price p(v¯) > pˆ(v¯), which is strictly above the
associatedminimumincentive compatible price pˆ(v¯), the respectivefirm
can always increase its profit by offering a higher quality v¯ + ε (where
ε is positive but sufficiently small) for some higher price p(v¯ + ε) >
p(v¯) + γ ε that satisfies p(v¯ + ε) ≥ pˆ(v¯ + ε). Because by assumption all
its customers are willing to pay more than the cost difference γ ε
for the increase in quality, the firm will not loose any customers if
p(v¯ + ε) is sufficiently low, and because p(v¯ + ε) > p(v¯) + γ ε the firm’s
profit per customer will increase. The argument fails when the price
is already at the associated minimum incentive compatible price, that
is, when p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯), and some or all customers—although willing to
pay the higher production cost γ ε— are not willing to pay the higher
production plus incentive cost pˆ(v¯ + ε) − pˆ(v¯) = (1 + ρ)γ ε > γ ε for the
quality increase. Obviously, the argument also fails when quality is
already at its maximum v = 1. Of course, Proposition 2 is only relevant
when an equilibrium exists. However, because in an equilibrium with
mixed strategies all strategies that are chosen with positive probability
must be payoff-maximizing, the proof holds for equilibria in mixed
strategies as well.
28. Shaked and Sutton (1983, p. 1472) characterize the respective assumption as
follows: “Where that condition is satisfied, all consumers will be agreed in ranking the
products in the same strict order, at unit variable cost.” Translated into our setting, this
means that R(v, s) − c(v) is strictly increasing in v, that is, Rv(v, s) − c′(v) > 0, for all
s ∈ S. Because c(v) = c(0) + γ v, it follows that Rv(v, s) > γ for all v ∈ (0, 1) and s ∈ S.
29. For any given v¯ ∈ (0, 1) it is sufficient that Rv(v¯, s) > γ holds for the (unique) type
s(v¯) that solves R(v¯, s) − R(0, s) = (1 + ρ)γ v¯ (thus, s(v¯) is the “indifferent type” defined by
R(v¯, s) − pˆ(v¯) = R(0, s) − c(0)), whenever such a type exists. Because of Rvs (v¯, s) > 0, this
implies Rv(v¯, s) > γ for all higher types s > s(v¯), but for lower types s < s(v¯) it may hold
that Rv(v¯, s) ≤ γ . If a type s(v¯) does not exist, either R(v¯, s) − R(0, s) < (1 + ρ)γ v¯ for all
s ∈ S and no type will demand quality v¯ at the price pˆ(v¯), or R(v¯, s) − R(0, s) > (1 + ρ)γ v¯
for all s ∈ S and only then quality v¯ can be available in the market and the assumption
Rv(v¯, ·) > γ is needed. If for each v¯ ∈ (0, 1) the type s(v¯) exists and satisfies Rv(v¯, s) > γ ,
then p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯) for all v¯ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the proposition can be extended to the case
where the strict inequality in Rv(v¯, s) > γ is replaced by the weak inequality.
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Proposition 2 shows that if customers have a sufficiently strong
preference (relative to production cost) for high quality, then prices
for all quality levels v ∈ [0, 1) below 1 are determined by the sum
of production and incentive cost. The intensity of competition plays
no role. Customer preferences, as long as they satisfy Rv( ·, ·) > γ for
v > 0, and the distribution of customer types determine the quantities
demanded but not the equilibrium prices (which follow from the
incentive constraints alone). In addition, whenever two or more firms
offer the highest feasible quality v = 1, the price for maximum quality
v = 1 is also determined by the incentive constraint, that is, p(1) = pˆ(1),
because of Bertrand competition.
ProvidedRv(v, ·)> γ for all v ∈ (0, 1), Proposition 2 implies that in a
stationary equilibrium quality v is a function of the price p. Specifically,
v = 1(1+ρ)γ [p − c(0)] if c(0) ≤ p < c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ , and v = 1 if p ≥ c(0) +
(1 + ρ)γ . If p < c(0) implies beliefs v = 0, prices themselves can serve
as quality announcements and no explicit quality announcements are
needed.
It is useful to compare Proposition 2 with corresponding results
of standard oligopoly models of vertical product differentiation, where
quality is observable. In these models, it is crucial to distinguish simul-
taneous price-quality competition(firms observe neither their competitors’
quality choices nor their prices before making their own decisions)
and quality-then-price competition(firms decide first about quality and
then, after having observed their competitors’ quality choices, about
the price). In the latter case of quality-then-price competition (see, e.g.,
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983),
equilibrium prices will typically be above their competitive levels and
firms will differentiate in the sense that no two firms offer the same
quality. In the case of simultaneous price-quality competition this is
not necessarily so. If for all customers marginal willingness to pay (for
quality) exceeds marginal production cost (of quality), only maximum
quality is available in equilibrium and prices are given by marginal
production costs (Anderson et al., 1992, Section 8.3.2). This replicates
the (efficient) perfect competition equilibrium, but it must be assumed
that entry is free.30 If the efficient quality level (the level that maximizes
willingness to pay for quality minus production cost of quality) is not
the same for all customers and an equilibrium (in pure strategies) exists,
30. If entry is costly and the entry decisions of rivals can be observed before
simultaneous price-quality competition takes place, at most one firm will enter in a pure
strategy equilibrium because profits are zero whenever two or more firms produce (but
there are also mixed strategy equilibria with stochastic entry).
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prices will typically exceed marginal production costs and firms will
differentiate.31
While quality-then-price competition depicts probably the more
plausible strategic situation when quality is observable, our case of un-
observable quality is incompatible with quality-then-price competition.
Because firms are by assumption unable to observe their competitors’
quality choices, they are necessarily unaware of these choiceswhen they
decide about prices.32 Therefore, simultaneous price-quality competi-
tion is the appropriate assumption in our study.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we examined vertical product differentiation in an experi-
ence good market with free but costly entry. Customers cannot observe
a good’s quality before purchase, but after purchase the true quality
of the good is revealed. In our model, a continuum of quality levels is
technologically feasible, an endogenous number of oligopolistic firms
simultaneously competes in price and quality, and minimum quality
is supplied under competitive conditions. For each feasible quality
level above the minimum the price must sufficiently exceed average
production cost in order to provide incentives for the respective firmnot
to produce lower quality than announced. That is, prices are bounded
from below by “quality-assuring prices” (Klein and Leffler, 1981). In our
analysis we examined the effects of this floor of quality-assuring prices
on quality diversity and equilibrium prices.
Our study shows thatwhen each customer’swillingness to pay for
quality is convex with respect to quality (which includes, in particular,
the popular linear case), there is quality polarization: at most two levels
of quality, the lowest and the highest, are available in the market.
Whereas standard economics suggests that firms differentiate to avoid
price competition, the incentive compatibility constraint for quality
31. It is easy to see that an equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist. If some
firm makes a positive profit in equilibrium, all firms must make the same profit because
otherwise a firmwith a lower than maximal profit could raise its profit by slightly under-
bidding a firm with a higher profit. On the other hand, with a finite number of firms an
equilibrium where all profits are zero will not exist, provided preferences are sufficiently
heterogenous. This follows because if preferences are sufficiently heterogenous, there will
always be a price-quality combination with the price exceeding marginal cost that, given
the rivals’ price-quality choices, attracts some customers.
32. It is conceivable that firms decide first about quality announcements and then,
after having observed their competitors’ announcements, about the price. However,
because of the incentive constraints (4) these quality announcements have implications
for the prices and may even determine them (Proposition 1). If they do, we are back
at simultaneous price-quality competition. For these reasons we assume simultaneous
price-quality competition in our analysis.
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provision keeps the price from falling below the quality-assuring price
and thus severely limits price competition. This limitation of price
competition eliminates the need of firms to differentiate themselves
from competitors and has the effect that all oligopolistic firms offer
maximum quality.
If customer’s willingness to pay for quality is not convex with
respect to quality, no general results can be achieved. However, we
show that if customers have a sufficiently strong preference for high
quality, equilibriumprices of all quality levels, except for themaximum,
are completely determined by incentive constraints, that is, for all
intermediate quality levels equilibrium prices are identical with the
respective quality-assuring prices. Neither customer preferences (as
long as they satisfy the condition indicated above), nor the distribution
of customer types, nor the intensity of competition has any effect on the
prices of intermediate quality levels. They only determine the quantities
demanded and produced, given (predetermined) equilibrium prices.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Because the respective strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium of the restricted game, the incentive constraints for always
actually producing the announced quality are satisfied. Otherwise
customerswould not buy the respective firm’s product for a price above
c(0), the firm’s profit would be zero and it would not have entered the
market (because it has a positive entry cost). In addition, because all
competitors’ actions are constant in time, each firm’s (constant) choice
of quality and price maximizes in each individual period its per period
profit, given all other incumbents’ qualities andprices. Consequently, no
incumbent can improveher payoff bydeviating to adifferent (stationary
or non-stationary) strategy with respect to quality and price. Moreover,
each incumbent makes in each period a constant positive profit that
must exceed the entry cost times the discount rate ρ (otherwise the
respective firm would not have entered the market). Therefore, it is
optimal for each incumbent to enter in the first period and never to
exit. 
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we show by contradiction that if there is
only one brand name, it will offer maximum quality v = 1. Clearly, in a
stationary equilibrium the respective single brand name will not offer
minimumquality v = 0 because profits would be zero and the entry cost
could not be covered. Assume the respective brand name offers some
quality level v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for someprice p(v¯) ≥ pˆ(v¯) = c(0) + (1 + ρ)γ v¯. For
any customer s of the brand name it must hold that she prefers v = v¯
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for the price p(v¯) to (i) v = 0 for the price p(0) = c(0) and (ii) to not
buying at all, that is, it must hold that R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ max[R(0, s) −
c(0), 0]. If R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ R(0, s) − c(0) ≥ 0, then R(v¯, s) − R(0, s) ≥
p(v¯) − c(0) ≥ pˆ(v¯) − c(0) = (1 + ρ)γ v¯. Moreover, if for some s ∈ S,
R(v¯, s) − R(0, s) ≥ (1 + ρ)γ v¯ for some v¯ ∈ (0, 1), then R(1, s) − R(v¯, s) ≥
(1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ , because from Rvv( ·, s) ≥ 0 it follows that R(1,s)−R(v¯,s)1−v¯ ≥
R(v¯,s)−R(0,s)
v¯
. Thus, R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ R(0, s) − c(0) implies R(1, s) −
[p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] ≥ R(v¯, s) − p(v¯). In addition, if R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥
0 > R(0, s) − c(0), then R(v¯, s) − R(0, s) > p(v¯) − c(0) ≥ pˆ(v¯) − c(0) =
(1 + ρ)γ v¯ and thus R(1, s) − [p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] > R(v¯, s) − p(v¯)
because R(1,s)−R(v¯,s)1−v¯ ≥ R(v¯,s)−R(0,s)v¯ > (1 + ρ)γ gives R(1, s) > R(v¯, s) +
(1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ . Consequently, R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ max[R(0, s) − c(0), 0] al-
ways implies R(1, s) − [p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] ≥ R(v¯, s) − p(v¯). There-
fore, the respective brand name will not lose demand, if it offers quality
v = 1 for the price p(1) = p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ instead of quality
v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for the price p(v¯). In addition, its profit per customer will
increase from ργ v¯ to ργ . It follows that if there is only one brand name,
it will offer maximum quality v = 1.
Consider now the case of at least two brand names. By the
same argument as before, at least one firm offers quality v = 1. If two
or more firms offer quality v = 1, p(1) = pˆ(1) because of Bertrand
competition. In this case, any third firm that offers some quality
v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for some price p(v¯) ≥ pˆ(v¯) will attract customer type s
only if R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ max[R(1, s) − pˆ(1), R(0, s) − c(0), 0]. However,
we have already shown that R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ max[R(0, s) − c(0), 0]
implies R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≤ R(1, s) − [p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] ≤ R(1, s) −
[ pˆ(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] = R(1, s) − pˆ(1). That is, whenever some type
s prefers v = v¯ for the price p(v¯) to v = 0 for the price p(0) = c(0) and to
not buying at all, that type prefers, at least weakly, v = 1 for the price
pˆ(1) to v = v¯ for the price p(v¯). Consequently, any firm that offers some
quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for some price p(v¯) ≥ pˆ(v¯) has demand of measure
zero, and thus zero profits, and cannot cover its entry cost. Hence
whenever at least two firms offer v = 1 no intermediate quality v ∈ (0, 1)
will be available in the market. The same conclusion follows if only one
firm offers v = 1 for the price p(1) = pˆ(1). The remaining case is the one
where v = 1 is being offered for some price p(1) > pˆ(1) by a single firm
and at least one other firmoffers v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for someprice p(v¯) ≥ pˆ(v¯).We
have already shown that R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ max[R(0, s) − c(0), 0] implies
R(1, s) − [p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] ≥ R(v¯, s) − p(v¯). Therefore, the firm
offering v = v¯ can have customers only if p(1) ≥ p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ
because otherwise R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≥ max[R(0, s) − c(0), 0] implies
R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) ≤ R(1, s) − [p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ ] < R(1, s) − p(1), that
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is, rather than buying v = v¯ for the price p(v¯) each type s ∈ S
prefers either not to buy at all, to buy v = 0 or to buy v = 1. If
equality p(1) = p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ holds, the set of customers is of
measure zero, thus positive profits of the firm offering v = v¯ imply
p(1) > p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ . If the respective firm offers instead
v = 1 for the price p˜(1) = p(v¯) + (1 − v¯)(1 + ρ)γ < p(1), it will not lose
any customers (because, as shown, R(1, s) − p˜(1) ≥ R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) for
each customer s) and take all customers from the rival firm that offers
v = 1 for some price p(1) > p˜(1). In addition, its profit per customer
and hence its payoff increases. Thus, also in this last case it cannot
be an equilibrium that some firm offers some intermediate quality
v¯ ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, there is no case where a brand name offers an
intermediate quality v ∈ (0, 1). In contrast, it is an equilibrium that all
brand names offer quality v = 1 for the price pˆ(1), provided the market
can accommodate at least two firms (i.e., if two firms offer quality v
= 1 for the price pˆ(1), each firm’s discounted stream of profits covers
the entry cost). If the market accommodates at least one firm (i.e., if for
a single firm that offers quality v = 1 for the profit-maximizing price
p(1) ≥ pˆ(1) the discounted stream of profits covers the entry cost),
quality v = 1 will be available in the market for some price p(1) ≥ pˆ(1).
For the proof of the second part of the proposition, which assumes
Rs(1, ·) > 0, consider first the case where quality v = 1 is available for
some price p(1) ≥ pˆ(1) and is demanded by some but not all customers,
that is,R(1, smax )− p(1)≥max [R(0, smax )− c(0), 0] andR(1, smin )− p(1)≤
max [R(0, smin )− c(0), 0]. Then there exists a unique type s¯ ∈ S such that
R(1, s¯) − p(1) = max[R(0, s¯) − c(0), 0]. Uniqueness follows because
R(1, ·) and s=R(1, ·)−R(0, ·) are both strictly increasing in s and because
of the following contradiction: if R(1, s¯) − p(1) = R(0, s¯) − c(0) > 0
and R(1, s¯ ′) − p(1) = 0 > R(0, s¯ ′) − c(0) for some s¯ ∈ S and s¯ ′ ∈ S,
then R(1, s¯) − p(1) > 0 = R(1, s¯ ′) − p(1) implies s¯ > s¯ ′ because
Rs(1, ·) > 0, whereas R(1, s¯) − p(1) = R(0, s¯) − c(0) and R(1, s¯ ′) − p(1) >
R(0, s¯ ′) − c(0) imply s¯ = R(1, s¯) − R(0, s¯) = p(1) − c(0) < R(1, s¯ ′) −
R(0, s¯ ′) = s¯ ′ and thus s¯ ′ > s¯. Moreover, because R(1, ·) and s = R(1, ·) −
R(0, ·) are both strictly increasing in s, all types s ∈ [smin, s¯)
either consume quality v = 0 or abstain from consuming the
good, and all types s ∈ (s¯, smax] consume quality v = 1. Because
R(1, s) − pˆ(1) = R(1, s) − c(0) − (1 + ρ)γ decreases strictly with ρ, the
solution s¯ of R(1, s¯) − pˆ(1) = max[R(0, s¯) − c(0), 0] must also strictly
decrease with ρ for s¯ ∈ (smin, smax). Finally, if all types s ∈ [smin , smax ]
demand v = 1, s¯ = smin; and if no type s ∈ [smin , smax ] demands v = 1,
s¯ = smax. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction. Consider some firm
that in a stationary equilibrium offers quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for the price
p(v¯) > pˆ(v¯). Assume the firm increases quality v¯ to v¯ + ε > v¯, where
ε ∈ (0, 1 − v¯]. Because by assumption Rv(v¯, s) > γ for all s ∈ S, it follows
that R(v¯ + ε, s) = R(v¯, s) + ∫ v¯+ε
v¯
Rv(v, s)dv > R(v¯, s) + γ ε. This implies
R(v¯ + ε, s) − R(v¯, s) + p(v¯) > p(v¯) + γ ε, and thus there exists a price
p(v¯ + ε) such that R(v¯ + ε, s) − R(v¯, s) + p(v¯) > p(v¯ + ε) > p(v¯) + γ ε.
Consequently, R(v¯ + ε, s) − p(v¯ + ε) > R(v¯, s) − p(v¯) holds for all s ∈ S
for a price p(v¯ + ε) > p(v¯) + γ ε. Moreover, if a sufficiently small ε > 0
is chosen, p(v¯) + γ ε ≥ pˆ(v¯) + (1 + ρ)γ ε = pˆ(v¯ + ε) because by assump-
tion p(v¯) > pˆ(v¯). Hence there exists an ε > 0 such that for a price p(v¯ +
ε) > p(v¯) + γ ε ≥ pˆ(v¯ + ε), that is, for a price that exceeds p(v¯) + γ ε and
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (4), it holds for all s ∈ S
that R(v¯ + ε, s) − p(v¯ + ε) > R(v¯, s) − p(v¯). The latter inequality implies
that every customer who in the assumed stationary equilibrium buys
quality v¯ at the price p(v¯) would buy quality v¯ + ε at the price p(v¯ + ε),
if available. Consequently, if the firm that offers quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for
the price p(v¯) > pˆ(v¯) deviates and chooses the alternative strategy to
announce and produce quality v¯ + ε and charge the price p(v¯ + ε), the
firmwill have at least asmanycustomers asunder its original strategy. In
addition, because p(v¯ + ε) > p(v¯) + γ ε and hence p(v¯ + ε) − c(v¯ + ε) >
p(v¯) + γ ε − c(v¯) − γ ε = p(v¯) − c(v¯), the firm’s profit per customer will
increase. Hence the deviation will increase the firm’s payoff, and thus
the strategy to offer quality v¯ ∈ (0, 1) for the price p(v¯) > pˆ(v¯) cannot
optimal. This contradicts the assumption that it is an equilibrium
strategy and proves that under the assumptions of the proposition it
cannot hold that p(v¯) > pˆ(v¯) in a stationary equilibrium. Together with
the incentive compatibility constraint (4) this implies p(v¯) = pˆ(v¯). If
Rv(v, s) > γ for all v ∈ (0, 1) and all s ∈ S, then the same argument
shows that it cannot be optimal to offer any quality v ∈ (0, 1) for a
price p(v) > pˆ(v), and thus p(v) = pˆ(v). Finally, p(0) = c(0) = pˆ(0) holds
trivially. 
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